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Abstract: The aim of this paper is to examine translation of the European arrest warrant in the light 
of intercultural communication. The paper consists of three parts. The first part addresses major 
aspects of judicial cooperation in criminal matters within the territory of the European Union (EU) 
and introduces the European arrest warrant (EAW) as one of the major legal instruments of such 
cooperation. The second part focuses on the notion of legal translation as an act of intercultural 
communication. The third part illustrates, via translation of the European arrest warrant, how 
certain differences between the two most important legal families of the world, the Common Law 
and the Civil Law, influence the process of intercultural communication. 
 
TŁUMACZENIE EUROPEJSKIEGO NAKAZU ARESZTOWANIA W ŚWIETLE 
KOMUNIKACJI MIĘDZYKULTUROWEJ 
 
Abstrakt: Niniejszy artykuł poświęcony jest badaniu nad tłumaczeniem Europejskiego nakazu 
aresztowania (ENA) w świetle komunikacji międzykulturowej. Artykuł składa się z trzech części. 
Celem pierwszej z nich jest przedstawienie głównych aspektów współpracy sądowej w sprawach 
karnych w Unii Europejskiej (EU) oraz przybliżenie ENA jako jednego z głównych instrumentów 
prawnych prawa karnego UE. Część druga omawia tłumaczenie ENA w świetle komunikacji 
międzykulturowej. Część trzecia opisuje w jaki sposób pewne różnice pomiędzy dwoma 
najważniejszymi systemami prawnymi, tj. prawem zwyczajowym oraz prawem cywilnym 
(kontynentalnym) wpływają na proces komunikacji międzykulturowej. 
 
Major aspects of judicial co-operation in criminal matters within the territory of the 
European Union: introduction of the European arrest warrant 
 
On 21 September 2001, the European Council met in an extraordinary session to analyze 
the international situation in the wake of the disastrous and deadly terrorist attacks in the 
United States (cf. Conclusions and Plan of Action of the Extraordinary European Council 
Meeting at http://www.consilium.europa.eu/ueDocs/cms_Data/docs/pressData/en/ec/140.
en.pdf). 
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Under Article 2 of the Conclusions and Plan of Action of the Extraordinary 
European Council Meeting related to the European Policy to Combat Terrorism, the 
European Council approved the plan of enhanced police and judicial cooperation and 
announced its agreement to introduce a European arrest warrant.  
Hence, many assume that introduction of the European arrest warrant was an 
immediate outcome of the said European Council meeting, while the necessity to reform 
the extradition procedures was recognized 20 years ago (Gilmore 2002: 144).  
The beginnings of judicial cooperation in EU date back to 1-2 December 1975, 
when the Ministers of Interior met in Rome with a view to combat terrorism, radicalism, 
extremism and international violence (Terrorisme, Radicalisme, Extremisme, Violonce 
Internationale), the so-called TREVI Group, that met twice a year until 1993 when it was 
substituted for the meetings of European Council for Justice and Home Affairs (JHA) 
(Hofmański et al. 2008: 19).  
The abolition of checks at the internal borders and creation of a single external 
border under the Schengen Agreement of 14 June 1985 and Schengen Convention of 19 
June 1990, which came into effect in March 1995, facilitated criminals‘ operational 
mobility and entailed the undesired consequence of the increased transnational crime 
(Fennelly 2007: 521). 
To counterbalance free movement of persons in EU and to guarantee security 
within the territory of the Schengen States, the Schengen Convention included the so-
called ―compensatory measures‖, e.g.: the strengthening of judicial cooperation and 
mutual assistance in criminal matters, mutual assistance for the purposes of preventing 
and detecting criminal offences, creation of the Schengen Information System (SIS), 
faster extradition procedures (cf. Schengen Acquis Official Journal of European Union 
22.2000: p. 435). 
The Treaty on European Union (TEU) signed on 1 February 1992 in Maastricht, 
which came into effect on 1 November 1993, established judicial cooperation in criminal 
matters under the III pillar (JHA) (Hofmański et al. 2008: 21).  
Under the Amsterdam Treaty signed on 2 October 1997, which entered into 
force on 1 May 1999, Title VI – Provisions on Police and Judicial Cooperation in 
Criminal Matters, the Union‘s objective was formulated as follows: 
―to provide citizens with a high level of safety within an area 
of freedom, security and justice by developing common 
action among Member States in the field of police and 
judicial cooperation in criminal matters…‖ (cf. OJ C 340 of 
10 November 1997)  
The Tampere European Council of 15-16 October 1999 reiterated the significance of the 
Union as the area of freedom, security and justice, however, its novelty relates to mutual 
recognition of judicial decisions under article 33 (Gilmore 2002: 144): 
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―Enhanced mutual recognition of judicial decisions and 
judgments and the necessary approximation of legislation 
would facilitate cooperation between authorities and the 
judicial protection of individual rights. The European 
Council therefore endorses the principle of mutual 
recognition which, in its view, should become the 
cornerstone of judicial cooperation in both civil and criminal 
matters within the Union. The principle should apply to 
judgments and to other decisions of judicial authorities.‖  
The Tampere Conclusions also urged to undertake steps with reference to extradition: 
―With respect to criminal matters, the European Council 
urges Member States to speedily ratify the 1995 and 1996 
EU Conventions on extradition. It considers that the formal 
extradition procedure should be abolished among the 
Member States as far as persons are concerned who are 
fleeing from justice after having been finally sentenced, and 
replace by a simple transfer of such persons, in compliance 
with Article 6 TEU. Consideration should also be given to 
fast track extradition procedures, without prejudice to the 
principle of fair trial. The European Council invites the 
Commission to make the proposals on this matter in the light 
of the Schengen Implementing Agreement.‖ (cf. Tampere 
European Council 15 and 16 October 1999, Presidency 
Conclusions). 
The principle of mutual recognition as the cornerstone of judicial cooperation under III 
pillar is of outstanding significance and the Framework Decision (2002/584/JHA) of 13 
June 2002, which introduces the European arrest warrant constitutes an example of its 
implementation (Hofmański et al. 2008: 28). 
The said Framework Decision on the European arrest warrant and the surrender 
procedures between Member States, replace the following extradition proceedings 
between Member States: the 1957 European Extradition Convention on the suppression 
of terrorism, the 1978 European Convention on the suppression of terrorism as regards 
extradition, the agreement of 26 May 1989 between 12 Member States on simplifying the 
transmission of extradition requests, the 1995 Convention on the simplified extradition 
procedure, the 1996 Convention on extradition, the provisions of the Schengen agreement 
(cf. Framework Decision 2002/584/JHA (4)).  
The Framework Decision defines the European arrest warrant in Chapter 1(1) as: 
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―[…] a judicial decision issued by a Member State with a 
view to arrest and surrender by another Member State of a 
requested person, for the purposes of conducting a criminal 
prosecution or executing a custodial sentence or detention 
order.‖ 
Pursuant to Chapter 1, Article 1, Paragraph 2 of the said Framework Decision: 
―Member States shall execute any European arrest warrant 
on the basis of the principle of mutual recognition and in 
accordance with the provisions of this Framework Decision.‖  
A European arrest warrant may be issued for acts punishable by the law of the issuing 
Member State by a custodial sentence or a detention order for a maximum period of at 
least 12 months or, where a sentence has been passed or detention order has been made, 
for sentences of at least four months (cf. Framework Decision (2002/584/JHA Article 
2(1)).  
The list of 32 offences giving rise to surrender pursuant to the European arrest 
warrant includes, inter alia: participation in a criminal organization, terrorism, 
corruption, forgery of means of payment, sexual exploitation of children and child 
pornography, illicit trafficking in narcotic drugs and psychotropic substances, murder, 
grievous bodily injury, counterfeiting and piracy of products (cf. Framework Decision 
2002/584/JHA Article 2(2)) .  
The innovative character of the European arrest warrant is attributed to: (1) its 
judicial nature, (2) partial abolition of double criminality check with reference to the 
thirty two offences listed, i.e., the rule that an offence must be punishable both in the 
country, where the requested person is located and in the country issuing the warrant, (3) 
simplification and acceleration of the surrender procedures, (4) surrender of the requested 
person under the principle of mutual recognition and mutual trust, (6) independence of 
the requested person‘s surrender from his/her nationality (Gilmore 2002: 145-147; 
Hofmański et al. 2008: 56-57; Pérignon, Daucé 2006: 205-208).  
Article 8 of the Framework Decision defines the content and form of the 
European arrest warrant, which must contain the identity and nationality of the requested 
person, the name, address, telephone and fax numbers and e-mail address of the issuing 
judicial authority, evidence of enforceable judgment, the nature and legal classification of 
the offence, a description of the circumstances in which the offence was committed, 
including the time, place and degree of participation in the offence by the requested 
person, the penalty imposed, if there is a final judgment, or the prescribed scale of 
penalties for the offence under the law of the issuing Member State.  
The European arrest warrant must be translated into the official language or one 
of the official languages of the executing Member States. 
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The notion of legal translation as an act of intercultural communication 
 
For the purposes of this paper translation of the European arrest warrant is understood as 
an act of intercultural communication.  
The evolution of translation understood as a static linguistic phenomenon to an 
act of intercultural communication materialized in the 1980s (Snell-Hornby 1988: 43; 
Pisarska 1996: 26; Munday 2001: 87; Snell-Hornby 2006: 51-55). 
Snell-Hornby (1988: 43) speaks of three new approaches introduced in Germany 
in the 1980s: Hönig and Kussmaul 1982, Reiss and Vermeer 1984 and Hölz-Mänttari 
1984. 
Hönig and Kussmaul in Strategie der Übersetzung (1982) delineate the notion of 
text understood as an integral part of a sociocultural background and stress the 
significance of the function of a translation (Snell-Hornby 1988: 45). For them, 
translation is dependent on its function as a text embedded in the target culture and the 
translator may either preserve the original function of the source text in its own culture 
(Funktzionskonstanz) or change the function to adapt to specific needs in the target 
culture (Funktzionsveränderung) (Snell-Hornby 1988: 44). Vermeer in the book, which 
he wrote with Katharina Reiss Grundlegung einer allgemeinen Translationstheorie 
(1984), emphasizes that language is not an autonomous system, but is part of a culture. In 
his view, the translator should not only be bilingual, but also bicultural (Snell-Hornby 
2006: 52). In his lecture given in Zurich on 21 May 1984, published as ―Translation as a 
cultural transfer‖ Vermeer (1986: 33) defines translation as: 
―[…] an offer of information in a language t of the culture 
T
1
, which imitates an offer of information in a language s of 
the culture S according to specified function. In other words, 
a translation is not transcoding of words or sentences from 
one language to another, but a complex form of action in 
which someone gives information about a text (source 
language material) under new functional and linguistic 
conditions and in a new situation, while preserving formal 
aspects as far as possible.‖ 
His explanation of translation abandons the linguistic definition of translation dominant 
at the time and provided by Koller: 
―In linguistic terms translation can be described as 
transcoding or substitution; elements a1, a2, a3… of the 
language system L1 are replaced by elements b1, b2, b3… of 
the language system L2‖ (Koller 1972: 69-70 as cited by 
Snell-Hornby 2006: 53-54 ). 
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The most important aspect of Vermeer‘s translation theory is the skopos (Greek word for 
‗aim‖ or ‗purpose‘). According to skopos theory the major principle determining any 
translation process is the purpose (skopos) of the overall translational action (Vermeer 
1996: 15; Pisarska 1996: 27; Nord 1997: 27; Munday 2001: 79; Snell-Hornby 2006: 51). 
Vermeer explains the skopos rule in the following way: 
―Each text is produced for a given purpose and should serve 
this purpose. The skopos rule thus reads as follows: 
translate/interpret/speak/write in a way that enables your 
text/translation to function in the situation in which it is used 
and with the people who want to see it and precisely in the 
way they want it to function.‖ (Vermeer 1989a: 20 as cited 
by Nord 1997: 29). 
The skopos theory is part of the theory proposed by Hölz-Mänttari who defines 
translation as an act of communication across cultural barriers. Hölz-Mänttari who 
presented her theory of translation in Translatorisches Handeln. Theorie und Methode 
(1984), reduces the status of the source text (Snell-Hornby 2006: 57) similarly to 
Vermeer, who spoke of ―de-throning of the source text‖ (Snell-Hornby 2006: 54). In her 
theory, she declines the notion of ―text‖ and introduces the notion of ―message‖ 
(Botschaft). Since both Vermeer and Hölz-Mänttari view translation as a cultural transfer 
rather than linguistic, in which language is part of the culture (Snell-Hornby 2006: 54), it 
follows that the concept of culture is essential for the functional approach to translation. 
The concept of culture accepted by Vermeer is that of Heinz Göring‘s, which in turn is 
based on the that of the American ethnologist Ward Goodenough (Snell-Hornby 2006: 
54; Nord 2001: 33): 
―Culture consists of everything one needs to know, master 
and feel, in order to assess where members of a society are 
behaving acceptably or deviantly in their various roles, and 
in order to behave in a way that is acceptable or deviant for 
that society, as far as one wishes to do so and is not prepared 
to take the consequences arising from deviant conduct.‖ 
(Göring 1977: 10, as cited by Snell-Hornby 2006: 55). 
Nord (1997: 33) emphasizes that Vermeer‘s own definition of culture concentrates even 
more on norms and conventions: 
―[culture is] the entire setting of norms and conventions an 
individual as a member of his society must know in order to 
be ‗like everybody‘ – or to be able to be different from 
everybody‖. (Vermeer 1987a: 28) 
The concept of culture understood as a totality of knowledge, norms and conventions is 
essential to the functional approach of translation as a form of communication and social 
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action as opposed to abstract code-switching and was later broadened by Heidrun Witte 
(Snell-Hornby 2006: 55). 
As regards Chrsitiane Nord, similarly to the theories above, her concept of 
translation is as she indicates ―basically functional‖ and the notion of ―function‖ is the 
primary criterion for the process of translation (Nord 2005: 5). 
Her model for translation-oriented text analysis contributes profoundly to 
understanding of the intercultural text transfer. As expounded by the author, a model of 
source-text analysis, which may be applied to all types of texts not only facilitates 
understanding of the function of the elements or features in the content and structure of 
the source text as a communicative occurrence, but also allows the translator to choose 
the suitable translation strategies for the intended purpose of the particular translation 
(Nord 2005: 5). 
To summarize the functionalist translation theories, it must be indicated that in 
contrast to the linguistic theories of translation, which saw translation as a static 
phenomenon, an activity merely between languages, a linguistic transfer based on the 
process of transcoding, the functionalist approach to translation is culture oriented, is 
oriented towards the function of the target text, proclaims de-throning of the source text, 
views texts as an integral part of the world, not an isolated specimen of language, and 
finally, as stated above, understands translation as an act of cross-cultural communication 
(Snell-Hornby 1988: 38). 
As regards legal translation, Ńarčević (1997: 55) and Cao (2006: 5) too define 
legal translation as an act of communication.  
However, although one must acknowledge the profound impact of the 
functionalist approach to translation studies in general, which as shown above 
transformed the very meaning of the translation process, the present author wishes at this 
point to present vital aspects of legal translation and explain why certain facets of the 
functionalist approach may not be applied to legal translation. 
As indicated by Ńarčević (1997: 12) and Cao (2006: 7) legal translation is a 
specialized area of translational activity due to the fact that it involves law and entails not 
only linguistic, but also legal consequences. 
Bearing this in mind, translation of legal texts is regarded as a double operation 
implying both interlingual and legal transfer (Constantinescu 1974: 147 as cited by 
Ńarčević 1997: 12). 
In addition, the normative function and authority of the legal texts makes legal 
texts special and entails significant consequences for legal translation (Ńarčević 1997: 11; 
Cao 2006: 10). 
Let us have a closer look at the typology of legal texts as presented by Ńarčević 
(1997) and Cao (2006) to understand the nature of legal documents in the first place. 
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Ńarčević (1997: 11) divides legal texts into the following three groups according 
to their function: 1) primarily prescriptive, 2) primarily descriptive but also prescriptive, 
3) purely descriptive. The first group includes laws and regulations, codes, contracts, 
treaties and conventions, and as indicated by Ńarčević, they are normative texts which 
prescribe a specific course of action. The second group of legal texts consists of hybrid 
texts, which are primarily descriptive but also include prescriptive parts. These include 
judicial decisions and instruments used to carry on judicial and administrative 
proceedings such as actions, pleadings, briefs, requests, petitions. The third group 
contains purely descriptive texts written by legal scholars, like legal opinions, law 
textbooks, articles. 
Cao (2006: 9-10) distinguishes the following categories of legal texts: 1) 
legislative texts, i.e., domestic statutes and subordinate laws, international treaties and 
multilingual laws, and other laws produced by lawmaking authorities, 2) judicial texts 
produced in the judicial process by judicial officers and other legal authorities, 3) legal 
scholarly texts produced by academic lawyers or legal scholars in scholarly works and 
commentaries, 4) private legal texts including texts written by lawyers, e.g. contracts, 
leases, wills, litigation documents, and texts written by non-lawyers, e.g. private 
agreements, witness statements and other documents produced by non-lawyers and used 
in litigation and other legal situations. 
From the enumerated variants of legal texts it follows that legal translation refers 
to the translation of the texts used in law and legal settings. 
The vast majority of the named legal texts are normative in character as stated 
above, that is they prescribe commands and prohibitions, grant permission and power, 
create obligations and rights (Cornu 1990: 264; 267). 
How does that compare with the functionalist approach to translation studies? 
Why may certain aspects of the functionalist approach to translation not be applied to 
legal translation? 
Firstly, as indicated by Hönig and Kuβmaul (1982) text is understood as an 
integral part of the sociocultural background and its function is of primary importance, 
the translator, as they say, may either preserve the original function of the source text 
(Funktionskonstanz) or change the function of the source text (Funktzionsveränderung). 
As regards legal translation, there is no doubt that the text is a communicative 
occurrence (de Beaugrande and Dressler 1981: 3) and as stated above it belongs to a 
given sociocultural background. However, in case of legal translation, the legal translator 
may not change the function of the source text, because the legal translator‘s role is to 
produce a text that is equal in meaning and effect to the source text. It is impossible to 
change the function of the target text, because the legal translator is bound by the 
principle of fidelity to the source text for preserving the letter of law (Ńarčević 1997: 16). 
In case of the European arrest warrant translation, for instance, the function of 
the source text may by no means be changed, because under Framework Decision of 13 
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June 2002, the European arrest warrant is a judicial decision and the legal translator is 
bound by the fidelity to the source text while translating the document for the sake of 
preserving the letter of law. 
As indicated by Ńarčević (1997: 16), even when the legal translators won the 
right to produce the texts in the spirit of the target language, the general indications and 
guidelines still pointed to fidelity to the source text. 
The same has been underlined by Herbot (1987: 822 as cited by Ńarčević 1997: 
72) the translator is obliged to produce a translation with ―the same legal signification‖: 
―Le text d‘arrivée doit avoir la même signification juridique 
(c‘est-a-dire qu‘il aura le meme consequences en droit) que 
le texte de depart.‖ 
With reference to Vermeer‘s skopos theory of translation, there are certain aspects, which 
may not be applied to legal translation either and here is why. 
Firstly, Vermeer‘s skopos theory, as indicated above, treats translation as an 
intercultural transfer (Nord 1997: 11, 34), whereas it must be remembered that in case of 
legal translation, the transfer is not only intercultural, but primarily legal (Constantinesco 
1974: 147 as cited by Ńarčević 1997: 12; Groot de 1987: 5). 
Secondly, Vermeer‘s translation theory regards the source and the target text as 
―an offer of information‖ (Vermeer 1982 as cited by Nord 1997: 12), which in case of 
normative legal texts is not applicable, because if both the source and target texts are 
normative in nature they are more than a source of information, that means they must be 
duly executed. 
Thirdly, Vermeer‘s theory of translation de-thrones the source text (Snell-
Hornby 2006: 54), which in the view of the present author should not be done. The 
significance of the source text for legal translation is profound, if the legal significance of 
the target text is to be the same. 
Thus, if the target text of a European arrest warrant as a judicial decision is to 
produce the same legal effect as the source text, it is advisable to conduct a careful 
analysis of the source text bearing in mind that it is an example of both intercultural and 
legal transfer, which as explained by Nord (2005: 24) shall enable the translator to 
establish the actual function-in-culture of a source text and compare it with the function-
in-culture of the target text required by the initiator and enable him/her to choose the best 
translation method. 
In addition, following Vermeer (1996: 15), there is a skopos for each 
translational act and different skopoi lead to different translations of the same source text. 
As explained by Reiss and Vermeer (1984: 139) the demand for fidelity is subordinated 
to the skopos, so if the skopos requires a change of function, the required standard of 
fidelity to the source text is not applied, the translator is then bound by appropriateness to 
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the particular skopos. This, however, does not hold true for legal translation, where the 
skopos of the target text is exactly the same as that of the source text. 
So, by way of illustration, if the European arrest warrant is a type of legal text of 
normative character issued by a EU Member State with a view to the arrest and surrender 
by another Member State of a requested person for the purposes of conducting a criminal 
prosecution or executing a custodial sentence or detention order, then, due to its 
normative character its function in the target text must be preserved. 
Moreover, the translation of the European arrest warrant must be done by a 
sworn translator, who is bound by the code of ethics of a sworn translator, which clearly 
defines the principles of an authenticated translation including the aspects of legal 
translation stated above, so any alterations to the texts are strictly forbidden (cf. Code of 
Conduct of a Sworn Translator with a Commentary issued by TEPIS 2007). 
Finally, in case of translation of legal texts of normative character, the 
translation once vested with the force of law, or authenticated may not be referred to as 
translation, but must be treated as an equally authentic, parallel, legal text (Ńarčević 1997: 
20, 64); Wagner 2002: 1, 7-9; Doczekalska 2009: 117), hence, as stated above, any 
amendments to the source text may only be done by its author, in case of the European 
arrest warrant, it may be done by a judge of a Regional Court in Poland, let alone the fact 
that such alterations must be indicated in the contents of the document together with the 
reasons and date of amendment. 
As further indicated by Ńarčević, despite the fact that Vermeer‘s theory refers to 
all types of texts (Vermeer 1982: 99 as cited by Ńarčević 1997: 18), Vermeer failed to 
convince the LSP translators that his theory was applicable to special purpose texts, 
because specialists in LSP translations insisted that the primary goal of LSP translators 
was to transfer the meaning or the message of the source text as precisely as possible 
(Fluck 1985: 136; Gémar 1995-II: 115 as cited by Ńarčević 1997: 18). 
In addition, as emphasized by Ńarčević (1997: 19), in claiming that the 
translation strategy of legal translation can be determined on the function of the target 
text alone, Vermeer failed to take account of legal criteria, while selecting the appropriate 
translation strategy, since as regards contracts, for example, the choice of translation 
strategy depends on the law governing the contract, viz., the contract may either be 
interpreted to the source or target legal system and in terms of linguistics, this identifies 
the system of reference, that is, whether the signs in the target text refer to objects and 
concepts in the source or the target legal system. 
To summarize the discussion of the applicability of the functionalist approach to 
legal translation, it must be emphasized that the contribution of the functionalist approach 
for the discipline of translation studies in general is vital and unquestionable. 
There is no doubt that the definition of translation gained a new image of a 
dynamic, bicultural, target oriented communicative event. 
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Although, as shown above, certain aspects of the functionalist approach cannot 
be accepted to legal translation, because ―on ne peut pas se permettre de traduire une loi 
comme on traduit un autre texte, car la traduction est aussi loi‖ (Legault 1977: 19). 
Having established the undeniable influence of the functional approach on the 
discipline of translation studies and explaining how legal translation may benefit from 
this approach and what facets of the said approach may not be applied to legal translation, 
in what follows the present author wishes to point out some major implications of the 
European arrest warrant translation in the light of intercultural communication. 
However, before the analysis begins, let us first have a closer look at the study of 
communication studies. 
Fiske (1990: 2) defines communication as social interaction through messages. 
Communication, as he points out, is central to the life of our culture, and without 
communication any culture dies. 
There are two main schools in the study of communication (Fiske 1990: 2-3). 
The first, which perceives communication as the transmission of messages, is concerned 
with how senders and receivers encode and decode the messages, how the transmitters 
use the channels and media of communication, which defines communication as a 
process by which one person affects the behaviour of or state of mind of another. The 
second, delineates communication as the production and exchange of meanings. It deals 
with how messages, or texts, interact with people in order to produce meanings; that is it 
is concerned with the role of texts in our culture. For this school, the study of 
communication is the study of text and culture and the main study is semiotics. Each of 
the mentioned schools interprets the definition of communication as social interaction 
through messages in its own way. For the first one social interaction is the process by 
which one person relates to others, or affects the behaviour, state of mind or emotional 
response of another. The school of semiotics understands social interaction as that which 
constitutes the individual as a member of a particular culture and society. 
As further explained by Fiske (1990: 3) each of the schools has a different 
understanding of what constitutes a message. The first one defines a message as that 
which is transmitted by the communication process with intention as its underlying 
factor. Semiotics, on the other hand sees a message as a construction of signs, which 
through interacting with receivers, produce meanings. 
It has on many occasions been established that translation in general is a 
communicative event taking place in a communicative situation (Nord 1997: 17; Nord 
2005: 13; Snell-Hornby 2006: 54). 
As such, it differs from any ordinary communicative event, because it entails 
participation of two cultures, two languages. In such a communicative situation, the 
source and target texts are part of a communicative act. 
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As emphasized by Nord (2005: 14) the prerequisite for such a communicative 
event is the existence of a situation in a given time and space, and participants wishing to 
communicate for a certain purpose by means of a text. 
The text understood as ―the totality of communicative signals used in a 
communicative interaction (Kallmeyer et al. as cited by Nord 2005: 16) has a function 
and is transmitted via a channel. 
The model of communication developed for the purpose of translation by Sager 
(1994: 93) distinguishes between several functional agents participating in the act of 
communication: producers of texts and massages, communication agents, i.e., senders of 
texts, recipients of texts and messages and mediators, i.e., translators. 
Under the said theory of communication, the message is encoded in a system of 
signs (Sager 1994: 94-96).  
As emphasized by Ńarčević (1997: 56), ―legal communication can be effective 
only if interaction is achieved between text producers and receivers‖. 
Who are the participants of the process of intercultural communication with 
regard to translation of the European arrest warrant?  
The procedures relating to issuing and execution of the European arrest warrants 
have been stipulated in the Polish Code of Criminal Procedure (cf. 
http://www.law.uj.edu.pl/~kpk/eaw/legislation/Poland_National_legislation_EAW.pdf).  
Under chapter 65a of the Code of Criminal Procedure on requesting EU Member 
States for surrender of prosecuted persons on the basis of a EAW and 65b requests from 
EU Member States for surrender of prosecuted persons on the basis of a EAW the 
participants of the intercultural communication process in the aspect of the European 
arrest translation include as follows: 
Firstly, the text producer, a Judge of a Regional Court in Poland, a representative 
of a judicial authority responsible for production of the EAW. On the official request of 
the Regional Public Prosecutor, a Judge of a Regional Court fills out the EAW form in 
the Polish language, which relates to a given person who had committed an offence, 
referred to, under the mentioned above Framework Decision, as ―requested person‖. 
Secondly, under article 607c § 2 a Warrant should be translated into an official 
language of the executing state. All the official documents must in Poland be translated 
by a sworn translator. The profession of the sworn translator is regulated under Act of 25 
November of 2004 (cf. Official Journal No. 273, item 2702). 
The sworn translator is sent the EAW original in the Polish language together 
with the translation brief, which is a decision of a Judge of a Regional Court appointing 
the sworn translator for the task of conducting the translation of the EAW. 
The translation brief includes the following information: the name of the Judge 
of the Regional Court who appoints the sworn translator for translation of the EAW and 
the name of the Court Clerk, the name of the Public Prosecutor at whose request the 
EAW is issued, the name of the requested person, the name of his parents, name and 
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number of his identity card or passport, place of residence, if available. The Judge states 
the reasons why a given EAW must be issued, that is, s/he describes what offence or 
offences were committed by the requested person. The committed offences relate to 
specific articles of the Penal Code which must be pointed out. In addition, the translation 
brief includes the date of expiry of the statute of limitation. The reason, which impacts 
directly the issue of the EAW is the fact that the requested person, which committed an 
offence wishes to evade justice and is sought after abroad in the territory of the European 
Union on the basis of the EAW. Finally, the translation brief includes the deadline by 
which the translation must be returned. 
The translated EAW is then returned to the Regional Court and is sent to a 
specific EU Member State judicial authority, in cases when the place of residence of the 
requested person has been established, if not, the data from the European arrest warrant 
are put into the Schengen Information System, which is supposed to facilitate the 
establishment of the place of residence of the requested person and next his/her detention, 
temporary arrest and execution of the EAW and finally his/her extradition to Poland. 
The judicial authority of the EU Member State which receives the translated 
EAW plays the role of the immediate target text receiver. The role of the target text 
receiver as the judicial authority responsible for the execution of the EAW is regulated by 
the Framework Decision and involves the hearing of the requested person under Article 
14. 
The Translation of the EAW in this case, as explained above may not be referred 
to as translation, it performs the function of the judicial decision in the foreign language 
and is subject to execution. Hence it must be considered as a parallel legal text. 
The role of the translator in the process of the intercultural and legal transfer is 
twofold. First, s/he is the mediator who bridges the gaps between two legal cultures. 
Secondly, s/he plays the role of the author of the target text. 
The role of the author of the legal text is subject to a number of constraints 
accompanying the process of translation, which constitute the final part of this paper. 
 
Legal, linguistic and cultural constraints in the translation of the EAW 
 
For the purposes of this paper, major implications relating to translation of the European 
arrest warrant refer to: (1) different legal systems and laws, (2) linguistic differences, (3) 
cultural differences. 
Cao (2007: 23) stresses that ―law and legal language are system-bound, that is, 
they reflect the history, evolution and culture of a specific system‖. ―Legal language is 
not a universal technical language but one that is tied to a national legal system (Weisflog 
1987: 203, as cited by Cao 2007: 23).  
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Under Article 8 of the Framework Decision, all Member States adopted an 
identical form and content of the European arrest warrant, which is attached in Annex 1 
to Framework Decision, to quash the diversity relating to legal systems in the EU.  
Although, as indicated by Górski and Sakowicz (2005) and Hofmański et al. 
(2008) the European integration of Member States and unification of law in the European 
Union for the purposes of an accelerated surrender of the requested persons, the translator 
carrying out translation of the European arrest warrant must bear in mind that the 
expressions used in point (b) devoted to decision on which the warrant is based: ―judicial 
decision‖ and ―enforceable judgment‖ connote different ideas under two legal families, 
namely that of the civil and that of the common law.  
Zweigert and Kötz (1998: 69) emphasize that:  
―The tradition of the English Common Law has been one of 
gradual development from decision to decision; historically 
speaking, it is case-law, not enacted law. On the Continent 
the development since the reception of Roman law has been 
quite different, from the interpretation of Justinian‘s Corpus 
Iuris to the codification, nation by nation, of abstract rules. 
So Common Law comes from the court, Continental law 
from the study; the great jurists of England were judges, on 
the Continent professors. On the Continent lawyers, faced 
with a problem even a new and unforeseen one, ask what 
solution the rule provides; in England and the United States 
they predict how the judge would deal with the problem, 
given the existing decisions‖. 
Hence, one of the challenges the legal translator deals with is the incongruency of legal 
systems. 
Under point (e) of the European arrest warrant, the translator translates the 
description of the circumstances in which the offence or offences was/were committed. It 
is under this point, where linguistic implications arise.  
As far as the linguistic constraints are concerned, Cao (2007) and Ńarčević 
(1997) attribute linguistic difficulty in legal translation to the absence of equivalent 
terminology across different languages. De Groot (2006: 424) claims that to achievement 
of full equivalence in translating the terminology is only possible when the source and 
target languages relate to the same legal system, which is applicable only in bilingual or 
multilingual legal systems, like in Belgium, Finland, Switzerland and to a certain degree 
in Canada. 
Despite the fact that under the Framework Decision the EU Member States 
adopted a common definition of the thirty two offences, the translator is aware of the fact 
that a definition of a particular offence in the 27 Member States implies different 
definitions in each State.  
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Lack of vocabulary equivalence has already been indicated by Humboldt, who 
stated that: 
―No one when he uses a word has in mind exactly the same 
thing that another has, and the difference, however tiny, 
sends its tremors throughout language. … All understanding, 
therefore, is always at the same time a misunderstanding … 
and all agreement of feelings and thoughts is at the same 
time a means for growing apart.‖ (Humboldt quoted in 
Cowan 1963, as cited by Jandt 2007: 131). 
In his seminal article Why Isn‟t Translation Impossible Joseph (1998: 86-97) cites 
Schopenhauer, Schleiermacher, Humboldt, de Saussure who addressed the issue of lack 
of vocabulary equivalence in their works. For instance, Schleiermacher stated: 
―But if one looks at a master‘s word formations in their 
totality, at his use of related words and word-roots in a 
multitude of interrelated writings, how can the translator 
succeed here, since the system of concepts and their signs in 
the translator‘s language is entirely different from that in the 
original language, and the word-roots, instead of being 
synchronically identical, cut across each other in the 
strangest directions. It is impossible, therefore, for the 
translator‘s use of one language to be as coherent as that of 
his author.‖ (Schleiermacher 1813 [1992: 45-46], as cited by 
Joseph 1998: 86-97). 
By way of illustration, under Article 228 section 1 of the Polish Criminal Code fraud is 
defined as follows: 
―Whoever, with the purpose of gaining a material benefit 
causes another person to disadvantageously dispose of his 
own or someone else‘s property by misleading him, or by 
taking advantage of a mistake or inability to adequately 
understand the action undertaken, shall be subject to the 
penalty of deprivation of liberty for a term of between 6 
months and 8 years.‖ 
By contrast, under Theft Act 1968 in UK, this offence is defined under Chapter 60 
Article 16(2)(c) as follows: 
―A person who by any deception dishonestly obtains for 
himself or another any pecuniary advantage shall on 
conviction on indictment be liable to imprisonment for a 
term not exceeding five years.‖ 
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Attention should be paid to two different expressions in the Polish Criminal Code – the 
―material benefit‖ and in the UK Act - the ―pecuniary advantage‖. The UK term implies a 
monetary advantage, while the Polish term connotes a broader benefit, which may be 
expressed in pecuniary terms. 
Cultural differences are the subsequent source of difficulty. In translation, 
language should not be regarded as an isolated phenomenon suspended in a vacuum but 
as integral part of culture, while the text is embedded in a given situation conditioned by 
its socio-cultural background (Snell-Hornby 1988: 2, as cited by Cao 2006: 31). The 
strong relationship between language and culture is a well established phenomenon and 
has on many occasions been underlined (Whorf 1956: 156; 214); Sapir 1966: 16; 69; 
Hofstede 2001: 21). 
Curran (2006: 678) described the characteristics of the language of the law in the 
following way: 
―The language of law is bound to the inner grammar of legal 
systems, cultures, mentalities, which in turn impede 
communication in words that are borrowed from another 
legal system, culture, and mentality.‖ 
She also points out that in comparative law translation is often carried out by 
approximation, so, for example, ―the French word ‗procès‘ is generally translated into 
English as ‗trial‘. She indicates, however, that certain attributes of ‗procès‘ are not 
attributes of ‗trial‘. Hence, similarly, the French or Polish ‗judge‘ is not the English 
‗judge‘, the ‗cour‘, or ‗sąd‘ is not the ‗court‘, and last but not least, the French 
‗jugement‘, or ‗wyrok‖ is not exactly ‗judgment‘. 
Furthermore, Curran (2006: 711) argues that: 
―If law is embedded in culture it may be that the study of law 
can be undertaken realistically only by adopting the 
standpoint of someone ‗inside‘ a culture, by a kind of 
‗immersion‘ in it. According to this approach, the 
comparatist must understand law in the same way that people 
who participate in its culture do. Such a study must recognize 
the integrity, identity, or coherence of the culture in which 
law exists, and the interwoven characteristics that make that 
culture unique and distinguish it from others. […] Law 
cocooned inside a culture, it might be claimed, is necessarily 
different from law that exists in another culture.‖ 
Hence, legal translators must successfully deal with cultural barriers between the SL and 
TL. 
This leads us directly to the implications related to conceptual equivalence, 
which refers to abstract ideas that may not exist in the same fashion in different 
languages. 
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By way of illustration, the word ―law‖, or ―judicial decision‖ connote different 
ideas in Poland and in the UK, because under the common law, the word ―law‖ refers to 
the body of case law, based upon judicial decisions and embodied in reports of decided 
cases, while the ―law‖ as understood by the civil law refers to the enacted law and codes 
(Zweigert and Kötz 1998: 69). 
The translation process has been compared to that of the comparative legal 
analysis by Bernhard Großfeld, a professor of law (Großfeld 1996: 118-122). 
Thus, the translator, similarly to the comparatist lawyer: 
―comes across legal institutions, procedures, and traditions 
which have no counterpart in the Continental legal world 
with which he is familiar. At every step he comes across 
legal institutions, procedures, and traditions which have no 
counterpart in the Continental legal world with which he is 
familiar.‖ (Zweigert and Kötz 1998: 181) 
The last but not least implication relating to legal translation is that of the choice of an 
appropriate translation strategy, which for a long time has been a contentious issue. 
As indicated by Ńarčević, some advocate literal translation for the sake of 
preservation of the letter of law (Cesana 1910: 5 as cited by Ńarčević 1997: 37; Didier 
1990: 280, 285, as cited by Ńarčević 1997: 16; Weisflog 1987: 191, as cited by Ńarčević 
1997: 17), while others favour idiomatic translation and creativity (Koutsivitis 1988: 344, 
as cited by Ńarčević 1997: 224). 
Although the said issue remains unsolved, ―substance must always prevail over 
form‖ (Ńarčević 1997). 
This brings us directly to another issue, namely that of equal effect of the 
authenticated translations. 
Ńarčević cites Didier, who claims that ―while lawyers cannot expect translators 
to produce parallel texts which are equal in meaning, they do expect them to produce 
parallel texts which are equal in legal effect‖ (Didier 1990: 211, as cited by Ńarčević 
1997: 71). Hence, as emphasized by Ńarčević the role of the translator is to ―produce a 
text that will lead to the same legal effects in practice‖ (Ńarčević 1997: 71). 
In view of the above, translation of the European arrest warrant must in practice 
lead to its execution by competent judicial authorities of the executing EU Member State. 
Isabelle Pérignon and Constance Daucé (2007: 203) and Hofmański et al. (2008: 
221) claim that the European arrest warrant is considered by the EU Commission to be a 
growing success story, and the Commission looks forward to strengthening the 
instrument in the subsequent years. In conclusion of the Report presented by the 
Commission of European Communities based on Article 34 of the Council Framework 
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Decision of 13 June 2002 on the European arrest warrant and the surrender procedures 
between Member States of 24 January 2006 we read that: 
―despite undeniable initial delay, the European arrest warrant 
is now operational in most of the cases provided for. Its 
impact is positive, since the available indicators as regards 
judicial control, effectiveness and speed are favourable, 
while fundamental rights are observed.‖ 
Hence, it follows that despite certain implications, which the translation of the European 
arrest warrant entails, the process of intercultural communication so far has been 
successful. 
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